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THE FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT AND THE
1980 ELECTION
FINANCING THE 1980 ELECTION. By Herbert E. Alexander. Lexing-
ton, Mass.: D.C. Heath & Co., 1983. Pp. xiii, 525. $35.00
POLITICS AND MONEY. By Elizabeth Drew. New York, N.Y.: Mac-
millan Publishing Co., 1983. Pp. viii, 165. $11.49
Reviewed by Richard Bniffult *
During the 1970's Congress and the Supreme Court paid the most sus-
tained attention in American history to the financing of federal election
campaigns. Congress passed a succession of measures, known collectively as
the Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA" or the "Act"), closely regulat-
ing the activities of candidates, parties, private organizations, and individu-
als in raising and spending campaign money.'
Prior to FECA, election finance was largely an extension of the private
marketplace. Campaigns were funded through private, voluntary contribu-
tions to parties and candidates, with donors contributing to the extent of
their interest and wealth, and private economic inequalities were replicated
in the political marketplace. 2 The central thrust of FECA was to move the
campaign finance process in a more egalitarian and public direction. Con-
gress restricted the size and source of campaign contributions, imposed limi-
tations on campaign expenditures,3 and provided for the optional public
funding of presidential campaigns.4 Public funding was intended to free
the major party nominees from the need to solicit wealthy donors and to
give all citizens an equal role in the financing of campaigns. The transfor-
mation of the campaign finance system, however, was incomplete. The Act
failed to provide for public funding of congressional campaigns, leaving
those campaigns dependent on private funding subject to contribution and
expenditure limitations. The Supreme Court, in its review of FECA in
Buckley v. Valeo,5 invalidated most of the Act's expenditure limitations, al-
• Associate Professor of Law, Columbia University. B.A. 1974, Columbia University.
J.D. 1977, Harvard University.
1. Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, Pub. L. 92-178, 85 Stat. 562 (1971); Fed-
eral Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972); Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974); Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475 (1976); Federal
Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, 93 Stat. 1339 (1979).
FECA is codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1982) and 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9013 (1982).
2. See generally A. Heard, The Costs of Democracy (1960); D. Adamany and G. Agree,
Political Money 28-42 (1975); L. Berg, H. Hahn &J. Schmidhauser, Corruption in the Amer-
ican Political System 88-108 (1976).
3. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. §§ 441e to 44 1g (1982).
4. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9013 (1982).
5. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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though it upheld the contribution restrictions and the public funding sys-
tem for presidential candidates. The result was the construction of a hybrid
system, consisting of public and private components, equalizing and free
spending elements.
The system appeared to work well enough at first. The 1976 presiden-
tial election, the first held under the regimen of reform, was profoundly
different from its predecessors: the major candidates derived their funding
largely from public subsidies and enjoyed relatively equal financial re-
sources. The contribution limits applicable to all federal candidates also
helped to curb the influence of large private donors on congressional
elections.
Two recently published studies of political finance during the 1980
campaigns, however, suggest that 1976 was not so much the harbinger of a
new era in election finance as the apogee of the reform impulse. The two
books, one by a political journalist and the other by an academic specialist
in campaign finance, differ significantly in format and style. Alexander's
Financing the 1980 Election, the sixth in his quadrennial series of reviews of
campaign finance, is a comprehensive analysis of the financial history of the
1980 elections based largely on data compiled by the Federal Election Com-
mission from reports submitted by candidates, political parties, and other
campaign spenders and donors. The raw material of Drew's Politics and
.Alney consists of interviews with politicians, political operatives, and large
contributors, newspaper accounts of their activities, and the author's own
experiences and observations. While Alexander strives to be purely descrip-
tive and objective, Drew's book is a polemic against the "corrupting" effects
of private money on the political process. Yet the two works complement
each other and-with Drew's interviews supplementing Alexander's statis-
tics-combine to demonstrate that while the 1970's reforms sought to alter
the nature of political fund-raising and spending, in the 1980 campaign
private wealth and special interest expenditures resumed their pivotal roles.
This review analyzes Drew's and Alexander's findings concerning the
effects of FECA on the financing of the general election phase of the 1980
presidential and congressional elections.6 These financial histories of the
1980 elections suggest that the mix of public and private components in our
campaign finance system has proven unstable, and that public and private
methods of financing political campaigns may not be easily reconcilable in
a single system after all. If this is the case, Congress and the Court may
have to consider again the degree to which our election campaigns should
be publicly or privately funded. That will require the resolution of the un-
derlying question of what the role of private wealth-and of private ine-
6. This review will not address the provisions of the public funding law dealing with the
presidential primaries or the funding of minor party or independent candidates. Alexander
reviews the financial history of the prenomination phase of the 1980 election, H. Alexander,
Financing the 1980 Election 135 (1983), and the financing of John Anderson and the minor
party candidates, id. at 341-57. Drew did not examine these aspects of the 1980 election.
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quality-should be in financing an electoral process nominally predicated
on the norm of political equality.
I.
The drafters of FECA envisioned a presidential campaign finance sys-
tem in which the major party candidates would be endowed with equal
financial resources, to be drawn almost exclusively from public funds. 7
Under FECA, each major party candidate is entitled to receive a $20 mil-
lion federal grant, adjusted for inflation.8 FECA also permits a modest fi-
nancial role for the national committees of the major political parties.9
Beyond that, the campaign finance law prohibits major party candidates
who receive public funds from accepting any private contributions and
from making any expenditures greater than their public allotments. In
1976, public funds accounted for 95% of spending in the general election
and, as a result, Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford had virtually equal finan-
cial resources, and engaged in virtually equal spending.'0
As both Drew and Alexander document, however, the 1980 election
was a very different story. Only 62% of President Carter's money, and only
46% of Ronald Reagan's, consisted of federal funds." Instead of the
roughly $34 million in public funds and limited national party spending
allotted to each of the major party nominees under the Act, spending for
Jimmy Garter amounted to $54 million, and expenditures on behalf of
Ronald Reagan totalled $64 million-almost double the public grant and
$10 million more than was spent for Carter.' 2 Private money came flooding
into the 1980 election, upsetting the equality between the candidates and
the equalized ability of citizens to influence the financing of campaigns.
A.
How did this occur? From a fiscal perspective, the 1980 election in-
cluded, in Alexander's analysis, not one but three distinct campaigns con-
ducted by or on behalf of each major party candidate.' 3 The first
campaign consisted of the public funds and limited national party spending
already outlined. Reagan and Carter each received $29.4 million from the
United States Treasury. 14 The Republican and Democratic National Com-
mittees were each entitled to spend two cents per eligible voter, or $4.6
million, raised from private donations. The Republicans raised and spent
7. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 689, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 4-8, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 5587, 5591-94.
8. 26 U.S.C. § 9004(a)(1) (1982); 2 U.S.C. § 44la(b)(1)(B) (1982).
9. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(2) (1982).
10. H. Alexander, Financing the 1976 Election 171-72 (1979).
11. H. Alexander, supra note 6, at 299 (Table 7-1).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 297-98.
14. Id. at 299.
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their full authorization; the Democrats spent slightly less.1 5 In this "cam-
paign," the goals of relative equality and independence from private contri-
butions were met. It was the other two "campaigns," which were funded
from private donations and provided unequal amounts of support to the
major party candidates, which set 1980 apart from 1976 and pointed in the
direction of 1972.
B.
The "second campaign," as described by Alexander, consisted of pri-
vately funded spending out of the candidates' control but capable of coordi-
nation with the candidates' campaigns. The most important component of
this second campaign was a product of a major loophole inserted by Con-
gress into FECA in 1979.16 The 1979 Amendments to FECA exempt from
the Act's contribution and expenditure restrictions money, raised by state
and local party committees, that is spent on volunteer activity or on voter
registration and get-out-the-vote drives.' 7 The purpose of the 1979 Amend-
ments was in part to remedy the perceived lack of storefront offices, bumper
stickers, leaflets, and other traditional "grass-roots" campaign activity dur-
ing the 1976 election. The decline in volunteer electioneering at the local
level in 1976 was attributed to FECA's tight expenditure ceilings and to the
decisions of the candidates to focus their resources on capital intensive
broadcast advertising. 18 The 1979 Amendments were intended to en-
courage greater individual involvement in politics by exempting labor in-
tensive activities from the financial restrictions of the Act.' 9 The 1979
Amendments permitted private contributions without limit so long as the
funds were used to support campaign activities at the grass-roots, and ex-
empted such grass-roots spending from the Act's expenditure limitations. 20
In 1980 the Republicans adroitly manipulated the grass-roots exemp-
tion to fund the Reagan-Bush field operation almost entirely from private
contributions. 2 1 The Republicans coordinated their grass-roots spending
and fund-raising at the national level. Notwithstanding the 1979 Amend-
ments' grass-roots focus, nothing in the law requires that the funds be spent
where raised or even that the funds be solicited by the state or local party
committee that is the nominal beneficiary of the contribution. The na-
tional Republican Party, acting as the agent of the state or local party and
15. Id. at 299-300, 324-26.
16. Id. at 297, 300-01, 326-27.
17. 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B)(x), (xii), (9)(B)(viii)-(ix) (1982).
18. H. Alexander, supra note 10, at 379.
19. H. R. Rep. No. 422, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in 1979 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 2860, 2868-69.
20. Although the 1979 Amendments exempt grass-roots activities only when conducted
by volunteers, "volunteer" is clearly a term of art since the Federal Election Commision per-
mits parties to give their volunteers "travel and subsistence or customary token payments."
11 C.F.R. § 100.7(b)(15)(iv) (1984); 11 C.F.R. § 100.8(b)(16)(iv) (1984). Such "token pay-
ments" could amount to as much as $30 per day. E. Drew, Politics and Money 106 (1983).
21. H. Alexander, supra note 6, at 311-12.
2086 [Vol. 84:2083
ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT
using the presidential candidate as fund raiser, solicited and received funds
throughout the country and channelled the money raised in states where
the party was strong to marginal districts where additional funds were
crucial.22
The Republican National Committee (RNC) channelled about $9 mil-
lion in privately raised money to various states to pay for state and local
party activities on behalf of the presidential ticket. When added to the
funds that state and local parties raised from their own sources and spent on
such activities, total state and local Republican committee spending on be-
half of the presidential ticket amounted to about $15 million.23 The Demo-
crats' state and local party committees trailed badly, spending no more
than $4 million on behalf of the Carter-Mondale campaign. 24
Alexander also treats as part of the "second campaign" funds spent by
corporations, trade associations, membership groups and labor unions on
partisan communications with their own memberships and constituencies
on behalf of the candidates, and on nominally nonpartisan activities di-
rected to the general public. 25 Alexander contends that here the Democrats
significantly outpaced the Republicans, with Carter having received the
benefit of $15 million in labor union spending on internal communications
with union members and their families and on voter registration drives, 26
while the Reagan-Bush ticket benefitted from only about $3 million in in-
ternal communications by corporations, trade associations, pro-Reagan un-
ions such as the Teamsters, and pro-Reagan membership organizations. 27
In this otherwise heavily researched and footnoted study, the pro-Carter
labor spending figure is only weakly substantiated by extrapolating a large
increase over labor's 1976 spending on behalf of Carter-Mondale "due at
least in part to inflation."'28
22. Much of the funding obtained through the grass-roots exemption consisted of so-
called "soft money." Federal law has long prohibited direct contributions by corporations
and labor unions to federal candidates, see infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text, and
FECA established limits on the size of individual contributions to federal candidates. Many
states, however, permit direct corporate and labor union contributions, and place no limits on
the amount individuals may contribute to state and local candidates. Such contributions-
forbidden by some states-are deemed soft money. The 1979 Amendments enabled the par-
ties to raise on a nationwide basis corporate or labor union money and large individual con-
tributions, and to funnel those contributions into those states where such spending was
permissible, free from federal limit and not subject to federal reporting. E. Drew, supra note
21, at 14-17, 101-06; see also H. Alexander, Financing Politics 128 (3d. ed. 1984).
23. H. Alexander, supra note 6, at 311.
24. Id. at 335. The lesson of 1980 was not lost on the Democrats. The day after his
nomination in 1984, Walter Mondale announced plans to raise $26 million in Democratic
Party money for the 1984 campaign to supplement the $41 million federal subsidy. See N.Y.
Times, July 22, 1984, at 1 col. 3, at 18, col. 2.
25. H. Alexander, supra note 6, at 298.
26. See id. at 338.
27. See id. at 302.
28. See id. at 338 and n.155. The 1976 labor figure, $11 million, is set forth without
clear empirical foundation. Alexander cites Malbin, Neither a Mountain nor a Molehill,
Regulation, May/June 1979, at 41, 43. Malbin states simply that in the 1976 election "labor
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Even assuming that the volume of pro-Carter labor spending roughly
matched the Republican state and local party spending on behalf of Rea-
gan-Bush, Alexander suggests that the grass-roots party spending, because it
was directly coordinated by the national Republican ticket, was more suc-
cessful in advancing the ticket than the relatively autonomous spending by
labor unions.29
C.
Using Alexander's analysis, the "third campaign" in 1980 consisted of
"independent expenditures"-spending by individuals and organizations
that, while not directly connected with a candidate or party, expressly ad-
vocated the election or defeat of a candidate.30 In 1976, such expenditures
came to less than $300,000.31 In 1980, however, independent expenditures
amounted to nearly $11 million during the general election phase of the
presidential election, virtually all of it on behalf of Ronald Reagan. 32 This
was able to spend approximately $I 1 million in internal communications with its members,
on voter registration, and on getting out the vote." Id. at 43. Malbin gives no authority for
the $11 million figure but he apparently relied on another article in the same issue of Regula-
lion-Epstein, An Irony of Electoral Reform, Regulation, May/June 1979,'at 35. His use of
Epstein's data is questionable, however. Based on FEC reports, Epstein found that political
action committees established by labor unions spent $17.5 million in 1975-76, of which $8.2
million consisted of contributions to congressional candidates. Even if all of the remaining
labor PAC disbursements are to be counted as influencing the outcome of the 1976 presiden-
tial election, that sum was only $9.3 million, not $11 million. See id. at 38. Nor is it clear
that all $9.3 million was expended in support of the presidential ticket in the general election,
since it is likely that at least some of this money was spent during the prenotnination phase of
the campaign, in PAC administration and overhead costs, and in connection with nonfederal
candidates and nonpartisan activities.
Since the bulk of labor spending was on registration, internal communication, get-out-
the-vote, and general political education, and since such expenditures need not be reported to
the FEC, a high degree of uncertainty concerning total labor spending is inevitable. Never-
theless, Alexander's treatment of the $11 million figure for the 1976 campaign and the $15
million figure of 1980 as constituting as precise a measure of labor spending as the figures he
gives on candidate, party, and independent committee spending seems unwarranted. The
actual reported labor PAC spending on the 1976 presidential election was $1.2 million, see H.
Alexander, supra note 10, at 550. In 1980 the actual reported labor PAC spending on the
presidential election was $1.3 million. See H. Alexander, supra note 6, at 338. Moreover,
given that most of the unreported labor spending was on registration and get-out-the-vote
activity, it is unclear how much of a boon this was to the Democratic ticket in 1980 since
Ronald Reagan received approximately 44% of union members' votes. See id. at 384.
29. See id. at 338. Alexander also included in the second campaign funds raised by the
candidates from private contributions to pay the legal and accounting costs incurred in com-
plying with the Act. FECA exempts such funds from its definition of regulated contributions
and expenditures. 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B)(ix), (9) (B) (vii) (1982). Reagan-Bush received $2.1
million for its compliance fund and spent $1.5 million on compliance during the campaign.
H. Alexander, supra note 6, at 301. Carter-Mondale raised and spent $1.5 million on compli-
ance costs. Id. at 326-27.
30. Id. at 298.
31. H. Alexander, supra note 10, at 363, 408-10 (independent spending for Carter was
$74,298, independent spending for Ford was $216,715).
32. H. Alexander, supra note 6, at 303, 328 ($10.6 million in independent expenditures
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third campaign is largely attributable to the decisions of the Supreme
Court, as magnified and manipulated by politicians' ingenuity in the search
for funds and contributors' commensurate creativity in the search for polit-
ical influence.
In Buckle v. Valeo,33 the Court reviewed FECA's contribution and ex-
penditure limitations. FECA places a $1000 limitation on the amount any
person may contribute to a single candidate per election, with an aggregate
annual contribution ceiling of $25,000 per contributor.34 FECA also sought
to restrict total campaign expenditures by federal candidates. Presidential
candidates were to be restricted to $10 million in the nomination phase and
an additional $20 million in the general election. 35 Finally, the Act sought
to impose a ceiling of $1000 per election on the sum of money any person
could spend in communicating directly to the voters, independent of any
candidate's campaign, in support of or opposition to a candidate.36
Viewing the campaign finance regulations largely through the prism of
the first amendment, the Court equated political spending with political
speech and determined that the expenditure limitations, by imposing "di-
rect quantity restrictions on political communication," trenched directly on
protected core political expression without commensurate justification.37
The Court contrasted "contributions"-money given to candidates by indi-
viduals or interest groups-with "expenditures"-money spent by a candi-
date or noncandidate in communicating directly with the voters. The
Court justified FECA's dollar limits on contributions because large finan-
cial contributions raised the spectre that the contributor might exact a
"political quid pro quo" from the recipient of the gift, and the public might
believe that such "corruption" occurred. 38 Moreover, contribution limita-
tions were seen as not infringing the core first amendment interest. "A con-
tribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his
views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for that support. '39
A contribution limit still permits "the symbolic expression of support evi-
on Ronald Reagan's behalf, $27,773 spent independently for Carter, and $209,781 spent in-
dependently opposing him). Five major committees produced the lion's share of independent
expenditures. Three of the groups-the North Carolina Congressional Club, the National
Conservative Political Action Committee, and the Fund for a Conservative Majority-were
prominent "new right" organizations active since the mid-1970's. The other two commit-
tees-Americans for Change and Americans for an Effective Presidency-were organized
during the 1980 campaign for the express purpose of aiding the Reagan election drive. The
five committees spent $9 million on Reagan's behalf. Id. at 318.
33. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
34. 2 U.S.C. § 441a (1982).
35. Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101, 88 Stat. 1263, 1263-64 (1974). The Act would also have
limited the ability of candidates to use their personal wealth on their own campaigns. Pub. L.
No. 93-443, § 101, 88 Stat. 1266 (1974).
36. Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101, 88 Stat. 1263, 1265 (1974).
37. 424 U.S. at 18.
38. Id. at 26-27.
39. Id. at 21.
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denced by a contribution, ' 40 but does not infringe the contributor's free-
dom to discuss candidates and issues directly.
By contrast, FECA's expenditure limitations would directly reduce the
total amount of political communication and could not be justified by the
anticorruption rationale. Whatever danger of "political quid pro quo"
might be posed by campaign spending was deemed adequately met by the
dollar limitations on contributions to candidates.4 1 The Court rejected out
of hand the argument that the limitations on campaign spending and in-
dependent expenditures were necessary "to mute the voices of affluent per-
sons and groups in the election process and thereby to equalize the relative
ability of all citizens to affect the outcome of elections."'42 The concept that
the speech of some individuals and organizations could be restricted to
equalize the relative ability of others to influence the political process was
summarily dismissed as "wholly foreign to the First Amendment" 43 and
hence unavailable to sustain the candidate and independent expenditure
restrictions."
The effect of Bucklq on the publicly funded presidential campaign sys-
40. Id.
41. Id. at 55.
42. Id. at 25-26.
43. Id. at 49.
44. In subsequent cases, the Court continued to adhere to the Bucklsy approach that
campaign finance regulation is to be analyzed primarily in first amendment terms, that the
sole justification for restrictions on campaign financing is the anticorruption rationale, and
that the contribution/expenditure distinction may be helpful in determining the intensity of
the first amendment interest and the strength of the anticorruption justification.
The Court's strong protection for independent expenditures intended to influence the
voters directly without passing through a candidate's hands was underscored in First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), in which the Court invalidated a Massachu-
setts statute restricting corporate spending to influence voters in a referendum election. The
corporate spending in Be/lott was in a sense doubly protected. As an expenditure aimed at
reaching the voters directly it was the kind of speech given the most protection in Buckle.
Moreover, as the referendum campaign did not involve the election of candidates, there was
no danger that public officials would be corrupted and therefore no justification for the limi-
tation on expenditures. The Court rejected the argument that the expenditure restriction was
designed to prevent corporations from using their wealth to exert "an undue influence on the
outcome of a referendum vote" on grounds that there was no showing on the record that
corporate advocacy "threatened imminently to undermine democratic processes," and that
absent such a showing, expenditure restrictions tend to denigrate, not serve, the first amend-
ment. Id. at 786-89; see also Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290
(1981) (invalidating a city ordinance establishing a limit of $250 on contributions to commit-
tees formed to support or oppose ballot measures). In Citizens Against Rent Control, the Court
found that "Buckl identified a single narrow exception to the rule that limits on political
activity were contrary to the First Amendment. The exception relates to the perception of
undue influence of large contributions to a candidate." Id. at 296-97 (emphasis in original).
Since contributions in connection with ballot measure campaigns raise no danger of exaction
of political quid pro quos from officeholders, the Court held that they may not, consistent
with the first amendment, be restricted; see also California Medical Ass'n v. Federal Election
Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 196 (1981) (plurality opinion) (upholding against first amendment
attack 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(CD, which establishes a $5000 limit on the amount an unincorpo-
rated association may contribute to its political action committee, on grounds that contribu-
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ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT
tern was limited in 1976. Although Bucklq invalidated the Act's across-the-
board ceiling on candidate expenditures--a limit that would have applied
to all presidential candidates whether or not they accepted public funds-
the Court in a footnote apparently affirmed a provision that made a presi-
dential candidate's eligibility for public funding contingent on his volun-
tary acceptance of the $20 million ceiling for his general election
spending.45 Both Ford and Carter accepted public funding in 1976 and
both complied with the accompanying spending restrictions.
46
Independent expenditures played a negligible role in the 1976 cam-
paign. Although Buckl had invalidated the FECA provision generally re-
stricting independent expenditures to no more than $1000 on behalf of any
candidate per election, the Court did not specifically examine the separate
provision restricting independent committees to expenditures of no more
than $1000 on behalf of any publicly funded candidate, and that provision,
section 9012(f) of title 26, remained on the books in 1976. Moreover, in-
dependent committees were a novelty in 1976. Persons seeking to support a
candidate or advance a cause traditionally gave money directly to that can-
didate or the candidate with the best position on the cause rather than
spend independently. Unless the spender were very wealthy, his money was
likely to have more impact if given to the candidate, combined with the rest
of the candidate's resources, and spent in the manner the candidate's strate-
gists determined would do the most good. Because contributors could give
and candidates could spend without limitation before the enactment of
FECA, there had been no incentive to form independent committees. Inex-
perience with FECA and the Federal Election Commission as well as the
truncated period for campaign planning between the Buckl decision early
in 1976 and the election that year left the candidates unable to work in-
dependent committees into their finance strategies. Moreover, Buckley/s
statement that independent expenditures may not be "prearranged or coor-
dinated" led both the campaigns and the independent committees to take
pains to assure a complete separation between candidates and the
committees.
4 7
tion "is not the sort of political advocacy that this Court in Buckle found entitled to full First
Amendment protection").
The Court's first amendment analysis is critically examined in Cox, Constitutional Is-
sues in the Regulation of the Financing of Election Campaigns, 31 Clev. St. L. Rev. 395
(1982); Leventhal, Courts and Political Thickets, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 345, 356-74 (1977);
Nicholson, Buckley v. Valeo: The Constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1974, 1977 Wis. L. Rev. 323; Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First
Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 609, 629-42 (1982);
Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 Yale L.J. 1001 (1976).
45. 424 U.S. at 57 n.65.
46. The restriction on publicly funded candidates was challenged by the Republican
National Committee on the eve of the 1980 election and was upheld by the Supreme Court
without opinion in Republican National Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 445 U.S. 955
(1980), aft'g, 487 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). Consequently Carter and Reagan in 1980
kept their direct spending within the statutory ceiling.
47. Buckler, 424 U.S. at 47. Indeed, according to Alexander, the 1976 Carter campaign
1984] 2091
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By 1980 the climate had changed. Political operatives came to assume
that despite section 9012(f) independent spending could not be limited
even in a publicly funded campaign. 48 The political community had be-
come more experienced with FECA and the Federal Election Commission
and saw how independent committees could be developed not simply, as
the Supreme Court had apparently assumed, to present issues and ideas the
major party candidates were failing to address, but also to support those
candidates without formal coordination. 49 The 1980 campaign demon-
strated that independent expenditures can provide major benefits for a can-
didate and can constitute a significant role for private funding in an
otherwise publicly funded campaign.50
As chronicled by Drew and Alexander, the independent committees in
1980 showed that "[t]here are all manners of ways in which people running
'independent' campaigns can run them in tandem with the candidates"
without formal consultation.5 1 The candidate and the independent com-
mittee may retain the same pollsters and the same media consultants, and
may use the same mailing lists. Simply by reading the newspapers and
political newsletters, independent committees can learn the candidate's
actively discouraged independent efforts for fear that such expenditures might be charged
against the Carter campaign's own expenditure ceilings. H. Alexander, supra note 10, at
363-64, 407-08.
48. See, e.g., Bolton, Constitutional Limitations on Restricting Corporate and Union
Political Speech, 22 Ariz. L. Rev. 373, 409-11, 418-19 (1980).
49. H. Alexander, supra note 22, at 64.
50. The pro-Reagan committees often couched their solicitations in terms of using the
committees to legally circumvent FECA's fund-raising restrictions. The Congressional Club
called its activities "Americans for Reagan" and advised recipients of its fund-raising litera-
ture that, "[a]s an independent campaign, Americans for Reagan can spend an unlimited
amount of money on behalf of Ronald Reagan." NCPAC called its operation "The Ronald
Reagan Victory Fund" and the Fund for a Conservative Majority called its own "Citizens for
Reagan in '80." The Fund's literature said, "[a]s an independent effort 'Citizens for Reagan
in '80' has no limit on expenditures before or after the nomination." Americans for Change
called its project "Reagan for President in '80," and in its literature it described itself as a
vehicle for raising money to elect Reagan. ("If you want to see a change in this nation in
1980 it's going to take much more than the $29 million that the federal government is al-
lowing Ronald Reagan."). See generally E. Drew, supra note 21, at 140-41 (intent of in-
dependent concerns to amass large sums of private money to elect Reagan).
Moreover, the independence of these committees could conceivably be subject to ques-
tion; several of the pro-Reagan committees had personal ties to the Reagan camp. Among
the officials of Americans for Change were James Edwards, the future Secretary of Energy,
who was a Reagan delegate to the 1980 Republican Convention, and Anna Chennault, co-
chairman of the Nationalities Division of the Reagan for President Committee; officials of
Americans for an Effective Presidency included Thomas Reed, who had managed Reagan's
1970 gubernatorial campaign and later joined the Reagan National Security Council staff.
See id. at 140.
51. See id. at 136-41; H. Alexander, supra note 6, at 142. FECA defines an independent
expenditure as one made "without cooperation or consultation with any candidate or any
authorized committee or agent of such candidate, and which is not made in concert with, or
at the request or suggestion of, any candidate, or any authorized committee or agent of such
candidate." 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (1982).
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campaign strategy, themes, areas of weakness or strength, and the official
campaign organization's plans for media "buys"-and apply their in-
dependent dollars accordingly.
Without direct contact, the candidate and the independent committees
may effectively speak to each other through the press. Drew quotes Patrick
Caddell, the Democratic pollster: "The principals in a campaign may
never speak, but through reading the press and other things they can know
as well as if they were sitting in the same room what states are being
stressed, where you need help, where you don't want it, what your issues
are."52 Paul Dietrich, whose Fund for a Conservative Majority spent over
$2 million on Ronald Reagan's behalf in the primary and general elections,
agreed: "There is no way to enforce independence . . .as long as one
group puts out information and gets it to the others."'53 Roger Stone, a
Republican political consultant who worked in the ReagAn campaign, told
Drew: "You wouldn't have to be a genius to figure out where to spend the
money. If Reagan shows up in Tennessee and Kentucky, you know that the
campaign considers them winnable states."'54
Given the magnitude of Reagan's eventual victory, it would be diffi-
cult to attribute a decisive role in the election to independent expendi-
tures.55 Nevertheless, the additional $10.6 million spent by private
committees to disseminate pro-Reagan communications enhanced Reagan's
spending by one-third over the public grant while Carter was the benefici-
ary of less than $30,000 in independent expenditures. In Alexander's words,
this third, independent committee campaign "did violence to the tightly
drawn systems" of FECA public funding and contribution and expenditure
limitations.5 6
The role of independent expenditures may continue to grow. The
fund-raising activities of at least some of the independent groups in the
1980 election may have been hampered because those groups were sued in
the summer of 1980 for their alleged violations of section 9012(f). 57 This
may have reduced their spending during the course of the campaign.58
However, a three-judge district court ruled section 9012(f) unconstitutional
52. E. Drew, supra note 21, at 139.
53. Id. at 136.
54. Id. at 138.
55. Alexander reports that independent expenditures were of critical value to Reagan
during the New Hampshire primary. Reagan was approaching that state's spending limit,
and the Fund for a Conservative Majority spent $60,000 on radio and newspaper advertising,
mailings and busing pro-Reagan volunteers to campaign stops. H. Alexander, supra note 6,
at 142. FCM expenditures were also of value in the Texas primary, when the Reagan cam-
paign was approaching the overall spending limit for the prenomination campaign. Id.
56. Id. at 3.
57. In the summer of 1980 Common Cause, the national citizens' lobbying organization,
sued to enforce section 9012(o against Americans for Change, one of the five major pro-
Reagan independent committees. The FEC subsequently entered the suit and expanded it to
reach the other pro-Reagan committees which had announced plans to exceed the $1000
spending limitation.
58. H. Alexander, supra note 6, at 315-17.
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and, when the litigation reached the Supreme Court in 1982, an equally
divided Court affirmed the decision of the lower court without opinion. 59
This spring the Court noted probable jurisdiction in another case raising
the constitutionality of section 9012(f) but chose not to hear the case until
after the 1984 election.60 Section 9012(f) remains on the books but under a
cloud. It is likely to restrain independent spending in 1984 even less than it
did in 1980.
Thus, as Drew and Alexander have documented, the easing of restric-
tions on party grass-roots fund-raising and spending and the lack of an ef-
fective independent expenditure limitation permitted a substantial role for
private donors and special interest spending and introduced significant ine-
qualities in spending on behalf of the major party candidates in the 1980
election. As politicians, wealthy contributors, fund-raisers, and special in-
terest groups become more familiar with the campaign finance laws it is
likely that the publicly funded share of campaign spending will decline fur-
ther and private money will once again become the engine that drives presi-
dential campaigns.
II.
The financing of congressional elections was never as fully reformed,
even in theory, as presidential campaign finance. Congress did not author-
ize public financing for its own elections, choosing instead to rely on the
traditional private financing system. Congress, however, sought to blunt
what were perceived as the critical vices of the private financing system-
the dependence of candidates and, ultimately, officeholders, on large dona-
tions from wealthy individuals, and the disparities in candidates' abilities to
attract contributions, which resulted in unequal, if not unfair, spending.
FECA's contribution limits were intended to force candidates to turn to
large numbers of small donors thereby broadening the number of citizens
involved in the financing of politics and diluting the influence of any single
large contributor. The expenditure limitations would eliminate the grossest
disparities in candidates' spending. Private wealth would play a role but its
influence would be diminished since both the overall cost of campaigns and
the size of individual contributions would be limited.
Since Bucklq invalidated FECA's general campaign expenditure limi-
tations before they would have become effective, it is unclear how this sys-
tem would have worked in practice, but it is doubtful that it would have
worked well. Without adequate public funding, expenditure restrictions
tend to favor candidates or parties who are already well-known to the voters
or who possess assets other than money for communicating with the electo-
rate, for example, incumbents, celebrities, and persons active in large mem-
59. Common Cause v. Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. 489 (D.D.C. 1980), aff'd by an equally
divided Court, 455 U.S. 129 (1982).
60. Democratic Party of the United States v. National Conservative Political Action
Comm., 578 F. Supp. 797 (E.D. Pa. 1983), prob.juris. noted, 104 S. Ct. 1906 (1984).
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bership organizations. 6 1 The benefit to incumbents would have been
compounded by the contribution restrictions, which, by prohibiting large
individual contributions, make it more difficult for an unknown or outsider
to obtain the necessary seed money early in a campaign to mount a viable
challenge. Without public funding, then, the most likely result of the con-
tribution and expenditure limitations would have been to cripple the ability
of most challengers to oppose incumbents effectively. 62 Given the absence
of public funding for congressional elections, the Supreme Court's may
have been correct in eliminating the expenditure restrictions in the Act,
thereby permitting at least some challengers to commit the resources neces-
sary to match the built in advantages of incumbency.
Contribution limitations alone have not led to a democratization of the
financing of congressional campaigns. As Drew and Alexander chronicle,
the wealthy individual donor has gone into relative eclipse, but has been
replaced not by an unorganized mass of public-spirited small givers but by
political action committees ("PACs") affiliated with corporations, unions,
trade associations, membership organizations, and special interest and sin-
gle-issue groups.63
PACs existed before the 1970's as a means of circumventing the older
restrictions on corporate and labor union poitical spending, but their legal-
ity was questionable. 64 FECA helped to remove that uncertainty, and
PACs began to increase in size and strength.65 The 1980 election witnessed
61. See generally G. Jacobson, Money in Congressional Elections 33-50 (1980) (expendi-
ture limitations favor incumbents because voters are more likely to vote for a candidate about
whom they have more information); Note, The Economics of the 1974 Federal Election Cam-
paign Act Amendments, 25 Buffalo L. Rev. 519, 535-38 (1976) (incumbents enjoy a competi-
tive advantage under the FECA Amendments that approaches a legally closed monopoly).
62. See, e.g., G. Jacobson, supra note 61, at 33-50.
63. See H. Alexander, supra note 6, at 138-39; see also Epstein, The PAC Phenomenon:
An Overview, 22 Ariz. L. Rev. 355, 360 (1980); Adamany, PAC's and the Democratic Financ-
ing of Politics, 22 Ariz. L. Rev. 569, 590 (1980).
64. Prior to 1971 the principal federal campaign finance statute, 18 U.S.C. § 610, pro-
hibited corporate and labor spending in connection with federal election campaigns. During
this period, a number of organizations, primarily labor unions, established political action
committees to raise and distribute funds for political purposes. The AFL-CIO's Committee
on Political Education (COPE) was the model of virtually all PACs. There were relatively
few business-related PACs since, given the lack of effective limitations on individual contribu-
tions, wealthy individuals affiliated with corporations could make political contributions for
those businesses. See generally Epstein, Business and Labor Under the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act of 1971 in Parties, Interest Groups, and Campaign Finance Law 107, 110-11 (M.
Malbin ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Epstein, Business and Labor] (money from business-
related sources entered electoral area in the form of individual contributions by wealthy per-
sons affiliated with corporations and other businesses). The legality of the PAC device as an
evasion of § 610 was twice drawn into question before the Supreme Court but the Court
resolved both cases without directly confronting the PAC issue. See United States v. UAW,
352 U.S. 567 (1957); United States v. CIO, 335 U.S 106 (1948).
65. FECA did not alter the long-standing ban on corporate and union contributions to
federal candidates, see supra note 64, but did authorize a corporation or union to use treasury
funds to establish and administer a "separate, segregated fund" to be used for political pur-
poses subject to the Act's dollar contribution ceilings. Moreover, FECA allowed corporations
1984] 2095
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
an explosive growth in the number of PACs and in the level of PAC activ-
ity.6 6 PAC contributions accounted for 27% of the funds received by candi-
dates who participated in the general election. Victorious House
candidates received 42.8% of their contributions from PACs. 67 Moreover,
PACs provided a significant portion of the funds contributed by the na-
tional political parties to those parties' Senate and House candidates.
As Drew and Alexander report, in the 1980 congressional campaign,
PACs were the most significant consequence of FECA. The individual con-
tribution ceilings forced candidates to broaden their financial bases, but the
time and cost involved in soliciting large numbers of supporters from an
undifferentiated public was great, and the likely return was small. PACs
filled the gap. PACs have access to organized constituencies with common
economic and ideological interests in pending legislation or political activ-
ity. They can collect numerous small contributions, aggregate them, and
make contributions in larger, more useful amounts, while assuring that the
donors' interests are heard in Congress. According to Alexander, the indi-
vidual "fat cat" has been replaced by the "institutionalization of special
interest influence" in the form of PAC lobbyists.6 8
The most significant patterns of political giving in 1980 were the dra-
matic growth in business-related and right-wing ideological PAC activity, 69
and labor unions to communicate on any subject, including partisan politics, with their re-
spective shareholders or members and their families, to solicit funds for their PACs and to
conduct nonpartisan registration and get-out-the-vote drives among these constituencies. The
FECA Amendments of 1974 further facilitated PAC operations by clarifying that corpora-
tions and labor unions that held government contracts were not prohibited from establishing
PACs. The 1976 Amendments clarified the rules governing solicitations by corporate and
trade association PACs of their constituencies.
In Pipefitters Local 562 v. United States, 407 U.S 385 (1972), the Supreme Court relied
on FECA to uphold the legality of a union-controlled, separate segregated fund financed from
systematically collected "voluntary" membership contributions.
66. In 1976 the 1146 PACs registered with the Federal Election Commission contributed
$22.6 million to Congressional candidates, or about 15% of total Congressional-related cam-
paign spending that year. During the 1980 election the number of PACs making contribu-
tions to Congressional candidates rose to 2551 and the amount contributed exceeded $55.2
million, or 23% of congressional campaign expenditures. H. Alexander, supra note 6, at
126-27 (Tables 4-19 and 4-20).
67. Id. at 368 (general election candidates received $51.9 million from PACs). Congres-
sional general election candidates spent $191.8 million. See id. at 117 (Senate), 119 (House).
68. Id. at 5; accord Epstein, supra note 63, at 363; Epstein, Business and Labor, supra
note 64, at 146-47 (through PACs corporations and business associations have "institutional-
ized" their electoral activities, replacing prior ad hoc, unsystematic approach); Kenski, Run-
ning with and from the PAC, 22 Ariz. L. Rev. 627 (1980).
69. PACs sponsored by corporations more than doubled their 1976 contributions, from
$9.6 million to $21.6 million. When the activities of professional associations, trade associa-
tions, and non-stock corporations are added, business-related PAC contributions to Congres-
sional candidates in 1980 amounted to approximately $38 million. H. Alexander, supra note
6, at 368-69, 371-72. Alexander writes that corporate spending continues to have "great
potential for growth"--as of 1980 only 276 of the Fortune 500 companies had their own
PACs. Id. at 372-73. By contrast, although the volume of labor union PAC spending in-
creased, labor's share of PAC activity declined. See id. at 369. Labor is "not expected to keep
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and the increased willingness of PACs to contribute to Republican chal-
lengers against Democratic incumbents.70 The rising tide of business and
conservative spending contributed to the stunning success of the Republi-
can Party in 1980. As in the presidential campaign, the Republican Party
excelled in developing a national fund-raising apparatus to reap PAC con-
tributions for Republican challengers at the state and local level. The na-
tional Republican congressional committees dramatically outdistanced
their Democratic counterparts in raising PAC money and distributing it to
Republican candidates. 71 Although commentators in the mid-1970's had
suggested that since PAC money tended to go to incumbents, PACs would
serve to entrench Democratic control of Congress, 72 the Republican success
in cultivating PAC support indicates that PAC money played a role in the
Republican capture of the Senate.
The emergence of PACs as a permanent force on the political scene
has, according to Drew, led to a politics in which fund-raising is a "continu-
ous activity." 73 Drew describes a Washington in which Representatives
and Senators, driven by fears that the large PAC treasuries could be com-
mitted to the support of opponents, have embarked on a perpetual pursuit
of campaign money. The candidates line up PAC and other special interest
supporters and amass extensive war chests well in advance of their elections,
driving up the costs of campaigns and leading their opponents to redouble
their pursuit of funds and PAC support. In Drew's provocative phrase, this
pattern of the fear of money fueling the search for more money has become
"the domestic equivalent of the arms race."' 74
pace with the predicted growth in the business PAC sector." Id. at 381; see also Epstein,
Business and Labor, supra note 64, at 115-38 (data suggests growth opportunities are limited
for labor PACs but virtually unlimited for further corporate and business PAC formation and
expression).
In the 1982-83 election cycle corporate-affiliated PAC giving rose another 36%, and
trade, membership, or health groups registered a 34% spending increase. Total donations by
both types of PACs amounted to $52 million. Labor contributions rose 47% to $20 million.
N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1983, at A16.
70. PACs have historically been drawn to incumbents, particularly ranking members.
See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 63, at 361; Cox, supra note 44, at 400. During the 1970's Demo-
crats controlled both Houses of Congress and the heavy preponderance of PAC giving went to
Democrats. In 1976, for example, 66% of PAC money went to Democrats. See H. Alexander,
supra note 6, at 368. In 1980, PACs gave more money to challengers, and 48% of PAC
contributions went to Republicans. See id.; see also G. Jacobson, supra note 61, at 232 (com-
parison of amount of PAC contributions to Democrats and Republicans in 1972, 1974, 1976
and 1978 elections).
71. See H. Alexander, supra note 10, at 100.
72. See Epstein, supra note 63; G. Jacobson, supra note 61.
73. E. Drew, supra note 21, at 3. For example, in February 1984, just half-way through
his six-year term, Senator Alphonse D'Amato had already raised $1.3 million for his Novem-
ber 1986 reelection race. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1984, at B3.
74. E. Drew, supra note 21, at 94.
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III.
The re-emergence of private wealth and special interest influence at
the heart of campaign finance, notwithstanding a decade of reform legisla-
tion, need not necessarily be a source of wonder or despair. A cynic could
easily conclude that reformers here as elsewhere were hopelessly naive. It
was inevitable, the argument goes, that politicians and organizations seek-
ing to influence politics would resist restrictions on their ability to obtain or
contribute money. They would circumvent limitations, exploit loopholes,
and manipulate regulations with an acumen born of their need for funds
and influence. In this view, campaign finance reform, like other measures
intended to legislate virtue, was doomed to fail.
The short answer to this analysis is that reform did not fail because it
was never fully tried. With respect to congressional elections, the Act was
crucially defective in its failure to provide for public funding. Effective
elimination of the influence of private wealth, the avowed goal of campaign
reformers, requires a comprehensive approach consisting of contribution
limitations, expenditure limitations, and public funding. A campaign fi-
nance law consisting solely of contribution limitations without concomitant
expenditure restrictions and public funding can hardly be said to be re-
formed unless a structural bias towards well-organized interest groups profi-
cient at soliciting and aggregating small donations constitutes a reform.
Presidential campaign finance reform was similarly incomplete. The relax-
ation of the restraints on political party spending and the lack of an effec-
tive control on independent committee activities permitted the large-scale
intrusion of private money into an ostensibly public process. It is difficult
to describe this as a truly reformed system.
A less cynical, but perhaps more telling critique of reform efforts con-
tends not simply that reform was doomed to fail but that efforts to curtail
the role of private wealth in financing election campaigns are misguided
and ought to fail. Political freedom, so the argument goes, requires that
each citizen have the right to seek and wield influence in the electoral pro-
cess. Obtaining and exerting political influence requires communication.
Individuals need to be able to tell their legislators what they want; consti-
tutents unhappy with the performance of their public officials need the op-
portunity to convince others of their positions; candidates and officeholders
need to communicate their actions and beliefs to the electorate. All this
communication requires money. To restrict private campaign spending is
to restrict political expression. Moreover, people do not speak only as indi-
viduals but also as organized groups. The existence of special interest
groups is inherent in freedom of association. The rights of such groups to
amplify the voices of their members is basic to political freedom and must
be protected. 75
75. See, e.g., Budde, The Practical Role of Corporate PACs in the Political Process, 22
Ariz. L. Rev. 555 (1980); Elliott, Political Action Committees-Precincts of the '80's, 22 Ariz.
L. Rev. 539 (1980).
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This, in essence, is the philosophy articulated by the Supreme Court in
Buckley v. Valeo. The first amendment seeks the "widest possible dissemina-
tion of information" and the "unfettered interchange of ideas."'76 Limita-
tions on political spending limit political speech and threaten to erode
political freedom. If individuals and interest groups are unequal in wealth
and those inequalities are reproduced through campaign spending in the
political arena, that is simply a fact of political life, inescapable in a free
society. The dangers of unlimited political spending are exceeded by the
dangers of limitations. Or, to use the economic metaphor so often relied
upon in political finance analysis, the "marketplace of ideas" requires that
everyone have the opportunity to peddle their ideas and their influence
freely. Restrictions on spending will inevitably distort this marketplace by
curtailing the total information available concerning the candidates and
their platforms and by favoring candidates or groups less dependent on
spending. If those with the greatest wealth obtain the greatest market share
and consequently gain electoral victory and government influence, that is
the way the free market works.
This analysis, however, is incomplete. The electoral process is not sim-
ply the marketplace for government influence. Elections are the corner-
stone of our system of democratic self-government, and the central public
function of our politics. While the market model may legitimate influence
won through unequal spending, our political theory is built on the very
different premise of political equality. 77 At least since Tocqueville's time,
"Democracy in America" has been synonymous with universal suffrage for
all members of the polity, and universal suffrage, in turn, has meant equal
voting rights for all voters. 78 One legacy of the Jacksonian Era has been the
repudiation of wealth as a qualification on the right to participate in the
electoral process. 79 "Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to
one's ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process."80 In the
name of political equality, and to fully vindicate the principle of "one per-
son, one vote," the Supreme Court has held unconstitutional the poll tax,8 1
candidates' filing fees,8 2 and statutes restricting to taxpayers the right to
76. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 266, 269 (1964)).
77. L. Berg, H. Hahn &J. Schmidhauser, supra note 2, at 41-42; M. Walzer, Spheres of
Justice 305-06 (1983).
78. 1 A. Tocqueville, Democracy in America 206 (Vintage ed. 1945); see also 3 J. Bryce,
The American Commonwealth 525-26 (1888) ("political equality," defined as "the equal pos-
session by all of rights to a share in the government, such as the electoral franchise and eligi-
bility to public office," found to exist in late nineteenth century America "in the amplest
measure').
79. See, e.g., L. Benson, The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy 7-20 (1961).
80. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).
81. Id. at 670.
82. See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972) (candidate filing fee require-
ments held to "[fall] with unequal weight on voters, as well as candidates, according to their
economic status" because it tends to exclude the "favorites" of "the less affluent segment of
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vote on bond issues. 83 Such measures were seen as introducing private eco-
nomic inequality into the political realm-as creating a "disparity in voting
power based on wealth"8 4 -and were invalidated for that reason.
The principle of political equality will not be satisfied by formal equal-
ity at the voting booth, for disparity in voting power based on wealth is
exactly what results when private political spending by individuals and or-
ganizations of unequal resources is left unrestricted and unequalized. In-
deed, political scientists have likened the fiscal side of our political process
to one of "weighted voting" or "multiple voting."'8 5 The Buckley Court was
clearly correct in finding that effective political communication requires
money-money to buy media time, prepare and disseminate campaign
literature, conduct polls, circulate endorsements, operate storefronts, and
convince, register, and turn out voters. When that money is provided by
private wealth and special interest groups, whether through contributions
or independent expenditures, these supporters acquire influence dispropor-
tionate to their numbers.
Inequality in campaign financing influences both the outcome of elec-
tions and the postelection behavior of governments. In terms of the election
of candidates, while the bigger spenders do not always win, they usually do.
Correlation is no proof of causation, but it is clear that the candidate with
the deeper financial resources and the greater backing of large contributors
is benefitted thereby and is more likely to win than his less well-financed
opponent.86 More significantly, campaign contributions influence the con-
duct of government. The officeholder comes to represent a financial con-
stituency as well as a geographic constituency of the voters who elected
him. 87 As Drew's Politics andMoney explains, when legislators are beset by a
the community"). Compare Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (upheld ballot access re-
striction tied to a measure of candidate's popular support).
83. See, e.g., City of Phoenix v. Kolodzieski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970) (general obligation
bonds); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969) (revenue bonds). See also Hill v.
Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975) (invalidating system requiring separate majorities of all voters and
of taxpayers as a condition for issuing municipal debt).
84. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972).
85. See L. Berg, H. Hahn & J. Schmidhauser, supra note 2, at 43-46; A. Heard, supra
note 2, at 48-49; Adamany, supra note 63, at 570-71.
86. In the 1982 elections, the winners outspent the losers in 28 of 33 Senate races. In
each race not involving an incumbent the big spender won. See Note, Equalizing Candi-
dates' Opportunities for Expression, 51 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 113, 115 n.1 1 (1982). In the 1980
House elections, there were 185 contests in which one candidate outspent the nearest rival by
two-to-one, and the big spender won in 178 of these races. Id. In the 1980 presidential
primaries, Reagan outspent Bush, Carter outspent Kennedy, and, in two-thirds of the con-
tests the winner outspent his closest competitor. See H. Alexander, supra note 6, at 152. And,
of course, Reagan outspent Carter that November. See supra text accompanying note 12.
87. A central theme of both the Drew and Alexander studies is how the PACs operate at
a national level, organizing contributions from outside a state or district. Thus, the office-
holder's financial constituency need not have any overlap or community of interest with the
electoral one. National groups of realtors, auto dealers, insurance underwriters, milk produ-
cers, seafarers, and right-to-lifers can determine whether a Representative or Senator will
have the money to mount an effective campaign or will see those resources thrown against
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multiplicity of requests for action, the key to political influence is the ability
to obtain a politician's attention, to gain access. Access is "the required
entry ticket for getting something done,""" and money provides access.
With a host of supplicants banging at his door, the politician is most likely
to admit "the ones who gave the money."8 9
Of course, big givers and moneyed interests are not the only successful
lobbyists on Capitol Hill and money is not the only route to political power.
Representatives, senators, and presidents have responded to ideology and
conscience as well as contributions. But as Drew points out, "[t]he plain
truth is that most issues before Congress do not involve great moral princi-
ples . . . . Most issues . . . are not issues of conscience or morality-they
are questionable calls. The people with money always have access and al-
ways have influence." 9° The reliance on private wealth to provide essential
campaign funds extends economic inequality into the political realm.
Moreover, since the principal sources of campaign money are rich indi-
viduals, businesses, professional organizations, and organized labor, their
domination of campaign finance contributes to a structural skewing of the
congressional agenda.91 The poor, the unemployed, the nonunion worker,
and most middle class people are not a part of this process. 92 In 1980, the
affinity of business-related PACs and conservative committees for Republi-
him. E. Drew, supra note 22, at 28-37. Drew quotes Iowa Congressman Jim Leach: "We're
seeing regional politics and state and citizen politics become national. National groups deter-
mine outcomes, whereas local constituencies used to provide the crucial role. This is new."
Id. at 34. Drew also notes the emergence of large PACs, such as the Business-Industry Polit-
ical Action Committee, which attempt to represent not simply individual companies or indi-
vidual trade unions, but industry-wide and even economy-wide business and collections of
business and trade associations. See also H. Alexander, supra note 6, at 377-79 (discussing
possible attempts to influence pending legislation through PAC contributions).
88. E. Drew, supra note 21, at 77.
89. Id. (quoting Charles Ferris, former Senate Democratic aide and former Chairman of
the Federal Communications Commission).
90. Id. at 79.
91. See, e.g., L. Berg, H. Hahn & J. Schmidhauser, supra note 2, at 79-80; see also A.
Heard, supra note 2, at 119 ("[T]he bulk of American campaign activities is financed by
businessmen.").
92. In 1980 only about 13% of voting age Americans made political contributions or
expenditures, see H. Alexander, supra note 6, at 422, and this figure is relatively high com-
pared to prior years. See Adamany, supra note 63, at 579. Most political donors are well
above the average in income and education. See id. The average contribution to a corporate
PAC in 1979-80 was $161.37. See H. Alexander, supra note 6, at 373; see also Arterton,
Political Money and Party Strength in The Future of American Political Parties 110 (J.
Fleishman ed. 1982) ("Despite the fact that the average direct mail contribution is quite
small, research on contribution patterns reveals that income is directly and strongly related to
political giving.'); H. Alexander, supra note 22, at 75.
The low level of political giving need not be seen as a reflection of a lack of concern for
politics since in the same year nearly 29% of taxpayers utilized the federal income tax checkoff
to earmark a small portion of their tax liabilities to the federal fund used to provide public
subsidies to the Presidential candidates. Id. at 423. Most likely, the low level of giving re-
flects a realistic assessment by most Americans that they are financially unable to give enough
to have influence.
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can candidates set the stage for Republican electoral victories, but the prob-
lem posed by the unchecked role of private wealth in campaign finance is
not primarily that of partisan imbalance. If business is where the money is
to be found, the Democrats are certain to pursue business interests. Indeed,
as Drew and Alexander describe, the Democrats began a concerted effort
after 1980 to raise funds in the business community. 93 Democrats may yet
be able to expand their financial base among corporations and other impor-
tant sources of political money, but only by developing a legislative pro-
gram and a party posture more geared to those interests. The real losers
will not be the Democrats but the less affluent. 94
Unrestricted private political spending thus gives the wealthy a voice
out of proportion to their numbers in society in the election of public offi-
cials, and enables them to dominate the legislative agenda. The private
financing of campaigns does not simply replicate social and economic ine-
qualities into our nominally egalitarian politics, but converts the political
process into a mechanism for reinforcing those inequalities in society.
Although American political campaigns have historically been pri-
vately financed, private wealth has never been given unlimited power to
influence elections. As early as 1907, concern over the economic power of
business corporations and the undue political influence such power could
buy led Congress to forbid corporations from making contributions to fed-
eral candidates.95 When in the 1940's labor unions were perceived as wield-
ing comparable power, they too were prohibited from making political
contributions. 96 Other monetary ceilings on individual political contribu-
tions were also enacted long before FECA.97 Although these limits were
weakly enforced and readily circumvented, they demonstrate an early and
consistent concern by Congress with the consequences of permitting private
93. E. Drew, supra note 21, at 38-46.
94. H. Alexander, supra note 6, at 457-59; cf. Weaver, Democrats' Platform Shows a
Shift from Liberal Positions of 1976 and 1980, N.Y. Times, July 22, 1984, at A20, col. 1 (1984
Democratic platform "favors social policies less generous and less expensive than those es-
poused in the past," deemphasizes welfare reform, income security, federal support for low-
income housing, and national health insurance). In the short-run, the Republicans have con-
tinued to be far more successful at fund-raising than the Democrats. For the 1981-82 election
cycle, the three major Republican committees-the Republican National Committee, the
National Republican Senatorial Committee, and the National Republican Congressional
Committee--spent $189 million, while the three corresponding Democratic committees-the
Democratic National Committee, the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, and the
Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee-spent only $28.5 million. See H. Alexan-
der, supra note 22, at 137.
95. Act of January 26, 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907) (current version at 2 U.S.C.
§ 441(b) (1982)).
96. Act ofJuly 19, 1940, ch. 640, §§ 13(a), (b), 54 Stat. 767, 770 (1940) (contributions to
candidates or political committees limited to $5000 per person; "person" defined to include
unions); Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 441(b)
(1982)) (prohibiting all political contributions or expenditures by unions in federal elections);
see United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1957); United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
97. E.g., Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925). See generally, A.
Heard, supra note 2, at 344-70 (discussion of restrictions on contributions).
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wealth to finance an egalitarian electoral process. The Buckley Court may
have been correct in stating that equalization of political speech is "wholly
foreign to the First Amendment," but restrictions on political spending in
order to vindicate the commitment to political equality have been strongly
rooted in our campaign finance laws. The failure of this earlier system to
check the extension of economic inequalities into politics led to FECA, with
its more extensive restrictions and its inclusion of a public funding
component.
Thus, while the critique of FECA as inconsistent with the free
speech/free market analysis of the electoral process may be well-taken, it is
itself subject to criticism as an insufficient description of our politics. The
concern for democratic equality has long played a significant part in struc-
turing federal campaign finance regulation. So long as our politics is com-
mitted to political equality, unlimited private spending that empowers the
rich undermines that commitment and invites efforts to curb the role of
private money.
IV.
Our campaign finance laws map the borderland between the values of
the marketplace and the norm of political equality.98 They constitute an
attempt to reconcile the political ideology which would confer on all citi-
zens equal rights to influence public decisionmaking with the reality of a
society in which the principal means of participation and influence-
money-is distributed in a radically unequal way. Our regulatory scheme,
an uneasy hybrid of equalizing and free market elements, embodies this
tension. Presidential public funding and contribution limits reflect the view
of elections as a public function in which private wealth has little place.
Privately funded congressional elections and the Supreme Court's invalida-
tion of limits on candidate, party, and independent spending treat cam-
paign finance as a matter of private interest and private influence, funded
by private contributors to the full extent of their wealth. The mix is, as the
Drew and Alexander studies demonstrate, essentially unstable. The free
market elements are eroding the equalizing ones. Unlimited private spend-
ing began to negate the hoped-for consequences of public subsidies in 1980
and this process is bound to continue and gather momentum. Contribution
restrictions without public subsidies in congressional elections have created
special opportunities for particular kinds of private interest groups and
have not contributed significantly to political equality. We will soon be
back where we were in 1972, if we are not there already.
What is to be done? Drew and Alexander present radically different
prescriptions. Drew views campaign finance regulation largely as a matter
of realizing the values of political equality; consequently, she would mini-
mize the role of private wealth in funding campaigns. She proposes public
funding of congressional campaigns, provision of free broadcast time for
98. See M. Walzer, supra note 77, at 310-11, 318-19.
1984] 2103
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
political advertisements, reimposition of limits on expenditures by in-
dependent committees, and closure of other loopholes in the presidential
campaign finance laws.99
Alexander, by contrast, treats campaign finance largely as a matter of
developing proper channels for the institutionalization of private economic
influence in the electoral process.10 0 He would check the role of PACs and
independent committees by expanding the funding capacity of individuals
and political parties. He would raise the limits on individual contributions
and repeal the $25,000 overall contribution limit for individuals, thereby
permitting a larger role for individual contributors to counterbalance the
influence of PACs.10 More importantly, he would strengthen the cam-
paign finance role of political parties. "[T]he most likely reform in the near
future," according to Alexander, is "political-party renewal."10 2 Alexander
suggests that such renewal could permit private politically oriented activity
while mitigating its most harmful consequences-special interest influence.
He conceives of the political parties as "intermediate structures" between
\politicians and the individuals and organized groups who would help them
hold office. The parties provide a mechanism for this electorate to express
tl~eir support and be heard by the politicians, yet are more "broadly based"
tl4an the PACs and tend to dilute the role of special interests and facilitate
toe formation of functioning coalitions which are necessary to postelection
government decisionmaking 0 3
Alexander presents a menu of proposals to strengthen the parties' cam-
paign finance role, including an increase in or elimination of the limits on
party contributions to candidates, on party spending on behalf of candi-
dates, and on party spending for grass-roots volunteer activity.10 4 In effect,
these proposals would give the parties a preferred role in campaign finance
by largely deregulating their fund-raising and spending activities. When
considered together with other proposals he presents to relax contribution
limits, Alexander's prescription becomes clearer. If Drew would more fully
realize the model of reform only partially accomplished in the FECA legis-
lation, Alexander would turn toward the campaign finance structure that
existed prior to the enactment of the 1970's reforms.
Who is right? In a sense, both are. The basic operational decision in
any election finance system is whether or not to provide candidates with
99. E. Drew, supra note 21, at 147. Since broadcast advertisement consumes the largest
portion of candidates' expenditures, free broadcast time would, in effect, make this portion of
the campaign publicly funded.
100. H. Alexander, supra note 6, at 476-82. Alexander elaborates his proposals and
their conceptual support in Alexander, Making Sense About Dollars in the 1980 Presidential
Campaign, in Money & Politics in the United States 32-35 (M. Malbin ed. 1984).
101. Id. at 479.
102. Id. at 477.
103. Id. at 479-82. But see Arterton, supra note 92, at 131-34 ("I]he national party
machinery on the Republican side resembles more the functioning of a political' action com-
mittee than it does a revitalized and nationalized version of traditional parties.').
104. See H. Alexander, supra note 6, at 479-82.
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public funds adequate to mount effective campaigns. Alexander assumes a
nonpublicly funded system. At present, congressional candidates receive no
public moneys, and, in an era of massive budget deficits, Alexander may be
right in concluding that Congress is unlikely to enact public funding for its
own campaigns in the near term.'0 5 Moreover, while presidential candi-
dates receive substantial public money, the rise of unlimited party and in-
dependent committee spending in 1980 suggests that public funds alone are
insufficient to permit a candidate to mount an effective campaign against a
candidate benefitting from significant party and independent spending.
In a privately funded world, with inequality of access and inequality in
opportunity to influence the process a given, Alexander's proposals may be
the better approach to take. Expenditure and contribution limits introduce
distortions into the market for political influence, favoring certain groups or
individuals over others. Expenditure restrictions favor those already known
to the voters or those who can communicate with the electorate more easily
without money. Contribution limitations favor the organized over the un-
organized; those seeking to advance their economic or ideological interests
on Capitol Hill over those without necessary political acumen or infrastruc-
ture. Restrictions on independent expenditures give the candidates and the
major political parties a monopoly on political speech without providing
any means of making them responsive to the views of those whose speech is
curtailed. A relative handful of large contributors and special interest
groups still dominate the process.
A deregulated private system would avoid the contribution and expen-
diture restraints that skew the process in favor of certain groups. Relaxing
the restraints on party fund-raising and spending could improve the polit-
ical process by making the parties, not PACs and special interest commit-
tees, the focal point of campaign finance. The parties may be more
heterogeneous, more inclusionary, and more internally democratic than
PACs and the independent committees. Party renewal could dilute the in-
fluence of single-interest groups and facilitate the formation of governing
coalitions. Indeed, the legislative success of the Reagan Administration in
1981-82 may be in part attributable to the increased fund-raising role of
the national Republican Party and the concomitant cooperation of the
White House, the Republican National Committee, and the Republican
congressional leadership.
Yet these reforms would do nothing to further the realization of the
goal of political equality in the campaign finance system. The electoral
process might be opened to more wealthy challengers (or challengers with
wealthy backers), and the proliferation of special interest groups might be
curbed, but the political process, and consequently politics itself, would re-
main in the grip of a minority composed of the wealthy and the well-organ-
ized. That is inevitable in any private financing system.
The adoption of an effective public financing system, as Drew advo-
105. Id. at 4.
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cates, constitutes a fundamental remapping of the political equality/free
market border.10 6 Public funding is intended to give all citizens an equal
role in the financing of candidates, and thus equalize the voice and influ-
ence that money currently provides. Candidates assured of public money
do not have to worry about lining up sources of funds and purchasing the
support of private treasuries. Politicians need attend only to their electoral
constituency, and not to a supplementary financial one. Moreover, as
money ceases to be the medium through which private individuals and or-
ganizations seek to influence the outcome of elections, the effects of inequal-
ity of wealth in society would not be so directly felt in the conduct and
outcome of the electoral process. A system of publicly funded campaigns
thus not only reflects the norm of political equality but may contribute to
its fuller realization in society.10 7
As the financial history of the 1980 election indicates, the provision of
public funds to candidates is not an effective means of advancing political
equality unless the role of private money is sharply curtailed. In 1980, un-
limited privately funded party and independent committee spending undid
the equalizing effects of public funding. In order to work, then, public
funding requires substantial restriction of party and independent commit-
tee spending.
Such restrictions are consistent with, if not mandated by, the premises
106. The states have been active in developing public financing systems for 'state and
local campaigns; by 1980, seventeen states had adopted some type of public funding mecha-
nism. These state programs differed widely among themselves and in comparison with the
federal public funding program. Approximately half the states with public funding allocate
the public money to the political parties. The other state programs distribute money directly
to the candidate, usually on a matching fund basis. The range of support varies from Hawaii,
which provides small sums to candidates for a wide variety of state and local offices, to Michi-
gan and New Jersey, where public financing is limited to gubernatorial campaigns but is
adequate to cover a significant proportion of these candidates' campaign costs. Since 1980,
three states have either deferred implementation of their public funding programs, or allowed
their programs to expire, while two additional states have enacted public funding mecha-
nisms. See H. Alexander, supra note 22, at 173-82; Jones, Financing State Elections, in
Money and Politics in the United States 198-204 (M. Malbin ed. 1984).
107. Public funding is, however, no guarantee of political equality. The political advan-
tages of incumbents derive from access to free media, and from their ability to provide con-
stituent service and command their constituents' attention, as well as from campaign
contributions. Special interest groups benefit from their greater degree of self-organization,
their greater attention to and mobilization around political issues, and their internal commu-
nications, as well as from their capacity to make large donations. The implementation of a
public funding system will require the resolution of difficult issues: How to deal with the
built-in advantages of incumbency; how to assure that the level of public funding will be
adequate to enable challengers to mount effective campaigns in a system where incumbents
write the campaign finance laws; who should receive public funds-candidates or parties?;
what should be the standard for the funding of independent candidates or candidates in party
primaries?; what is the proper role of internal communications in mass membership organiza-
tions?
Yet, while the elimination of inequalities of wealth from election campaigns is no guar-
antee that political equality will actually result, it would be a first step of profound signifi-
cance. True democracy is impossible under the current financing system.
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underlying a public funding system. To provide for public funding is to
decide that the financing of political campaigns must cease to be an exten-
sion of the marketplace and must instead become a public function respon-
sive to the interests of all citizens equally and not according to wealth.
Under public funding, the financing of electoral campaigns should be as-
similated to the financing of the casting and counting of ballots, on the
operatives of a board of elections. The public funding of electoral cam-
paigns, by transforming that process into a public function, requires that
campaign finance be insulated from the reach of private wealth.
As Congress was the cause of the loophole created by the 1979 Amend-
ments, Congress could provide a solution by repealing the grass-roots
spending exemption. If there is a perception that campaigns require more
funds for grass-roots activity, 0 8 that need could be met by increasing the
size of the public grant and directing that a portion of it go to state or local
committees for traditional grass-roots activities. Such a measure might bet-
ter serve the purposes of the 1979 Amendments since, as Drew and Alexan-
der have shown, in 1980 the primary beneficiaries of the 1979 grass-roots
provision were the Republican National Committee and the Republican
Presidential ticket, not the state and local parties. 0 9
The imposition of effective controls on independent spending raises a
more difficult constitutional question. While independent spending may
provide an important positive role in the private system by making the sys-
tem open to persons and groups not attached to the candidates or the major
parties, unlimited independent spending in a public system ultimately sub-
verts that system by reintroducing the private inequalities the public system
is intended to negate.110
In Buckley, the Court invalidated independent expenditure restrictions
imposed in a private system context. Could such restrictions be sustained in
the context of a public funding system? The outlines of an affirmative ar-
gument may be seen in the Court's campaign finance decisions. Although
the dominant theme in Buckley was the protection of unlimited private
spending as a necessary adjunct to political freedom, a secondary strand in
Buckley reflects concern for the impact of unrestricted, unequalized spending
on political equality. The Court's contribution/expenditure line and its
validation of FECA's contribution restrictions demonstrate a willingness to
accept a brake on the role of private wealth in politics in order to provide
108. E.g., Cheney, The Law's Impact on Presidential and Congressional Election Cam-
paigns, in Parties, Interest Groups and Campaign Finance Laws, supra note 64, at 238-48;
Huckshorn & Bibby, State Parties in an Era of Political Change in J. Fleishman, supra note
92, at 90 (In 1976 FECA limitations discouraged state and local parts activity in support of
the presidential candidates).
109. See Arterton, supra note 92, at 122 ("At least the first time through with [the 1979
Amendments] in place, the results were not as local, not as grass roots, and not as spontaneous
as envisioned.').
110. Cf. Rosenthal, Campaign Financing and the Constitution, 9 Harv. J. Legis. 359,
389 (1972) (discussing circumvention of pre-1971 limits on spending in congressional cam-
paigns through use of committees).
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for political equality, even at the cost of limiting spending and speech. I I
The contribution/expenditure distinction is questionable when presented
purely in free speech terms. 1" 2 Contribution limits do restrict campaign
speech. If no person can give a candidate more than $1000, then none of
the donors will be heard much more loudly than anybody else. That, of
course, is the purpose of contribution limits, but it restricts the full political
participation of the putative $50,000 donor. Moreover, contribution limita-
tions may inhibit a candidate's ability to raise and spend campaign money.
A candidate dependent on a small number of large donors will be unable to
raise money to fund the expenditures necessary for communication with the
electorate. On the other side of the line, large, widely noted independent
expenditures can make a candidate as beholden to the independent spender
as to a contributor. The contribution/expenditure line does not map the
contours of the first amendment so much as it attempts to impose some
restriction on unlimited spending for the sake of egalitarian political values.
Indeed, the Court recently emphasized the applicability of the model of
democratic equality to the analysis of campaign finance by reaffirming the
constitutionality of the long-standing congressional restriction on corporate
political spending.
In Federal Election Commission v. National Right to Work Committee
(,NRWC"), 1'3 the Court unanimously upheld a provision of FECA restrict-
ing the ability of a certain type of corporation to solicit funds for its PAC by
analogizing the solicitation restriction to the related ban on corporations
spending money in support of candidates. The "first purpose" of that ban,
which the Court deemed sufficient to justify the regulation at issue, "is to
ensure that substantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the special ad-
vantages which go with the corporate form of organization should not be
converted into political 'warchests.' "114 That such a restriction would limit
both the total volume of political speech and the speech of particular corpo-
rations was of little moment.
The NRWC decision is especially noteworthy in that the National
Right to Work Committee, although a corporation in form, is a nonprofit,
largely voluntary organization which far more resembles the model of a
group of citizens banding together to amplify their individual views-like
an independent committee-than of a business corporation committing its
111. See supra text accompanying notes 33-38.
112. Cf. Sproul, Corporations and Unions in Federal Politics: A Practical Approach to
Federal Election Law Compliance, 22 Ariz. L. Rev. 465, 495-96 (1980) (contribu-
tional/expenditure distinciton "blurred" by PACs which both make and receive contribu-
tions); see also California Medical Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 202
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (criticizing expenditure/contribution distinction); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 241-45 (Burger, CJ., concurring and dissenting) (same); Richards, The
Rise and Fall of the Contribution/Expenditure Distinction: Redefining the Acceptable
Range of Campaign Finance Reforms, 18 N. Eng. L. Rev. 367 (1983).
113. 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
114. Id. at 207.
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substantial capital to the pursuit of political influence.1 1 5 The Court ac-
knowledged this in noting that while the FECA provision "restricts the so-
licitation of corporations and labor unions without great financial resources,
as well as those more fortunately situated, we accept Congress' judgment
that it is the potential for such influence that demands regulation."' 1 6 The
incongruity in NRWCserves only to underscore the message that the dispro-
portionate political influence caused by "substantial aggregations of
wealth" may be curbed even though the unfettered dissemination of polit-
ical information is also thereby restricted." 17
Moreover, the Court's treatment of the candidate expenditure restric-
tions in the public funding context is also suggestive. Buckly invalidated
limitations on spending by privately funded candidates as incompatible
with the first amendment, yet the Court in Republican National Committee
("RNC") v. Federal Election Commission' 8 unanimously upheld the expendi-
ture restrictions imposed on candidates who received public funding. 1 9 As
RNC was decided without opinion its rationale is ambiguous. It may be
construed simply as a recognition of Congress' power to condition grants on
the grantee's acceptance of restraints on his or her behavior, 20 although an
infringement of core first amendment speech would be a high price to exact
for eligibility for federal grant money. 12 ' An alternative interpretation is
that RNCtacitly recognized that a shift to a public funding system reflects a
political decision to make equality, and not private influence, the basic
premise of the campaign finance system. Once that decision is made, re-
115. Id. at 199; see Democratic Party of the United States v. National Conservative
Political Action Comm., 578 F. Supp. 797, 821 n.34 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (characterizing the Na-
tional Right to Work Committee as "ideological" and "non-profit, largely voluntary" in con-
trast to corporations and labor unions), prob. juris noted, 104 S. Ct. 1906 (1984).
116. 459 U.S. at 210.
117. See Athens Lumber Co. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 718 F.2d 363 (11th Cir. 1983)
(finding NRWCcontrolling in upholding the constitutionality of provisions limiting corporate
contributions), app. dismissed for want ofjuris., cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1580 (1984).
118. 445 U.S. 955 (1980).
119. See supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
120. Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 487 F. Supp. 280, 284-85
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 445 U.S. 955 (1980); cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 n.65 (1976)
("Congress may engage in public financing of election campaigns and may condition accept-
ance of public funds on an agreement by the candidate to abide by specified expenditure
limitations.").
121. Cf. Federal Communications Comm'n v. League of Women Voters of California,
104 S. Ct. 3106 (1984) (holding that § 399 of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, which
prohibited television and radio stations receiving federal grants from editorializing, violates
the first amendment). In League of Women Voters the Court determined that Congress could
not, even under the Spending Power, condition the receipt of government funds on the waiver
of editorial speech protected by the first amendment. See id. at 3127-29 & n.27. By contrast,
in Republican National Committee the Court upheld the power of Congress to condition the re-
ceipt of money from the Presidential Election Campaign Fund on the candidate-recipient's
acceptance of expenditure limitations. The two cases, taken together, permit the inference
that, Buckl/y notwithstanding, private campaign-related expenditures may not be fully pro-
tected by the first amendment in the context of publicly funded campaigns.
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strictions on spending, incompatible with a private finance system, become
essential to preclude the reintroduction of spending inequalities which are
inherently destructive of the public funding system.
The Supreme Court's disposition of the case currently before it,
presenting the constitutionality of section 9012(f),122 could prove critical
for setting the future course of campaign finance regulation. The Court has
an opportunity to indicate the extent to which a public funding system sig-
nals a change in the basic postulates of campaign finance regulation and
permits the restriction of private political spending. If the Court were to
uphold section 9012(f), that would indicate that a viable public funding
system could serve as a constitutional alternative to the historic private
funding system and the current mixed private and public system. On the
other hand, an invalidation of section 9012(f) would likely lead to a further
erosion of the public funding system and accelerate the return to a system
financed, in large part, by private money.
V.
The Alexander and Drew reports on the financing of the 1980 elections
indicate that FECA's particular weaving of public and private financing is
coming unravelled. New attention to the rules and assumptions of our cam-
paign finance system is in order. Alexander's analysis assumes that our sys-
tem will be-and must be-largely privately funded, and seeks to deal with
the consequent special interest influence by expanding the financing roles of
parties and individual contributors to counterbalance the PACs and the
independent committees. The thrust of this approach is to make the laws of
the private funding system more consistent with its basic premises by der-
egulating the campaign finance market. Drew's solution would be to move
toward still greater public funding of federal elections. To be successful this
would necessitate sharply curtailing the ability of private individuals and
groups to engage in political expenditures in connection with federal elec-
tions. This approach would be more consistent with our norm of political
equality and would contribute to its fuller realization. To do nothing is
essentially to opt for the private system, with special preferences for well-
organized economic or ideological interest groups. This tendency was pur-
sued in 1980, and campaign finance reform does not currently appear to
have a high place on the national political agenda. It remains to be seen
whether these studies, or perhaps the financial history of the 1984 election,
can change that.
122. Democratic Party of the United States v. National Conservative Political Action
Comm., 578 F. Supp. 797 (E.D. Pa. 1983), prob.juris noted, 104 S. Ct. 1906 (1984); see supra
note 60 and accompanying text.
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